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Abstract
After the introduction of the “Reform and Openness” policy in 
1978, the proportion of SOEs in the Chinese national economy 
decreased. However, in response to the negative effect of the world 
financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government implemented 
economic stimulus measures worth 4 trillion RMB. The 
government invested mainly in infrastructure sectors and supplied 
preferential loans to SOEs to increase investment. Many market-
oriented entrepreneurs and scholars criticized this policy and 
named it “state advance, private-sector retreat”. The present paper 
suggests new perspectives on this issue which are dynamic, 
classified and two-dimensional viewpoints based on analysis of 
the telecommunications and color television set manufacturing 
industries.
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I.  OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER
The objectives of the paper are to propose a dynamic, classified and 
two-dimensional viewpoint to analyze the “state advance, private-sector 
retreat” phenomenon in China and to analyze the telecommunications and 
color television manufacturing industries as case studies.   
II.  BACKGROUND
1. Historical background
(1) “The private sector advances, the state retreats” 民进国退)
After its foundation, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) introduced 
a socialist economy in which state-run enterprises dominated the industri-
al field and people’s communes dominated the agricultural field. 
With the introduction of the “Reform and Openness” policy in 1978, 
China changed its socialist economy to a market economy. After the South-
ern Trip Announcement by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) in 1992, this reform 
was extended to the whole country, following which the CCP’s 14th Nation-
al Party Congress set the goal of a “Socialist Market Economy”. In 1993, 
through the amendment of the national constitution, state-run enterprises 
were renamed state-owned enterprises. In 1998, premier Zhu Rongji 
launched three major reforms including reform of SOEs under the princi-
ple of “Zhuadafangxiao” (抓大放小 ＝ Invigorate large enterprises while re-
laxing control over small ones.) At the same time, market penetration of 
private enterprises was promoted by the Chinese government. The report 
of the CCP’s 15th National Party Congress in 1997 identified “individual 
and private economy as important components”.
The accession of China to the WTO in December 2012 accelerated the 
reform of SOEs. In April 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) (国有资产监督管
理委员会) was founded to undertake integrated management of the owner-
ship of SOEs. In March 2004, the national constitution was amended to in-
corporate the concept of the “non-public economy”. In February 2005, the 
State Council adopted “36 non-public articles” (非公有 36条) which de-
clared “equal treatment of the public and private sectors” and defined 
more clearly the operational field and conditions for the private sector.
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In December 2006, SASAC Chairman Li Rongrong (李䕯融)  announced 
the specific fields which the public sector must control as set out below.
Absolute control
Military industry, delivery of electric power, petroleum and petro-
chemistry, telecommunications, coal, air transportation, marine transpor-
tation
Relatively strong control
Production facilities, automobiles, electronics and information, steel, 
nonferrous metals, chemicals, resource mapping/design, science and tech-
nology
The Anti-monopoly Law of China (反垄断法) was enacted in August 
2007 and came into force in August 2008. In this process, the proportion of 
SOEs in the Chinese national economy decreased (“private-sector advance, 
state retreat” 民进国退 )
Source: Guan [2010] 
As a result of closures, buyouts and bankruptcies among SOEs, the profit rate of 
SOEs recovered after 1998 and reformed SOEs grew into large global businesses. 
Figure 1   Share of SOEs
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(2) “The state advances, the private sector retreats” (国进民退)
The world financial crisis of 2008 affected China negatively, not 
through the financial market but through the decrease in exports. To re-
cover from this recession, the Chinese government has implemented eco-
nomic stimulus measures worth 4 trillion RMB since November 2008. The 
Figure 2   Profit rate as a proportion of total assets of SOEs and non-SOEs
Non-SOEs
SOEs
      Source: Marukawa [2013] 
The number of Chinese SOEs ranked in the Fortune 500 has increased and is 
higher than the number of Japanese firms. Overall, the proportion of SOEs in the 
Chinese national economy has decreased but the average size of SOEs (or SOE 
groups) has grown.
Table 1   Number of companies ranked in Fortune 500 by country (2005-2012)
Source: Jin [2013]
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Rethinking of the “State Advance, Private-Sector Retreat” Phenomenon in China（NAKAGAWA）2015】 17
government itself invested mainly in infrastructure sectors and supplied 
preferential loans to SOEs to increase investment.  
Moreover, there were some typical cases.
China utilizes mainly energy from coal (about 70%), and therefore 
many small mineral companies entered this market. In the recession, how-
ever, the Chinese government decided to close small, dangerous and envi-
ronmentally destructive coal mines, mainly in Shanxi province, most of 
which were privately operated.
In the 1960s, for reasons of transportation and national security, the 
Chinese steel industry had a dispersed structure. With the explosive in-
crease in demand for steel caused by the construction boom from 2001, 
many steel companies increased production capacity, which caused over-
capacity afterwards. The Chinese government closed some private steel 
companies, e.g. Jiangsu Tieben (江苏铁本公司).
After 2003, the Chinese government promoted market penetration by 
private passenger airlines. The private airline Spring Airlines Co,. LTD. 
(春秋航空公司) was set up in 2004. Following Spring Airlines, 13 other pri-
vate airlines were established and entered the market. But the Chinese 
government reorganized the airlines into three major state-owned airline 
groups and gave them preferential treatment. As a result, only four air-
lines survived as of 2013.
Remarks: figures from urban areas only
Source: Guan [2010]
Figure 3   SOE fixed assets exceeded those of the private sector in 2008
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enterprises)
Others
(year to year change、％)
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III.   PRECEDENCE RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF THIS 
PRESENTATION 
1. Precedence theories and opinions in China, the US and Japan
(1) China
The government policy of giving SOEs preferential status evoked crit-
icism from the private sector and neo-classical economists. They named 
this phenomenon “state advance, private-sector retreat”.
Wu Xiaobo (Wu, 2010) criticized the dominance of SOEs under three 
points. ①Monopoly of resources and government contracts ② Private en-
terprises are prohibited to enter upstream industries ③ Not formal but de 
facto barriers to entry (“glass door”).
The famous Chinese economist Hu Angang rejected the criticism and 
asserted that there was no statistical evidence to support the theory of 
“state advance, private-sector retreat” .
Other left-wing scholars said that because the efficiency of SOEs is 
not lower than that of the private sector in China and because western 
countries also have public corporations, the criticism was invalid.
SASAC undertakes management by classification but Zhang Huiming 
of Fudan University criticized the ambiguity of the classification (based on 
interview).
(2) US
Ian Bremmer, representative of the Eurasia Group, published an in-
fluential book titled The End of the Free Market in 2010 and called for a 
cautious approach to State Capitalism as in Russia, China and elsewhere. 
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Andrew Sza-
mosszegi and Cole Kyle) issued a report titled An Analysis of State-owned 
Enterprises and State Capitalism in China and asserted that the propor-
tion of SOEs including subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries in the national 
economy was greater than half.
(3) Japan
Miura [2012] recalculated the proportion of SOEs on an effective basis 
and supported Bremmer and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission. 
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Mariko Watanabe of Gakushuin University, a leading scholar of this 
field in Japan, divides Chinese industry into three fields, public monopoly, 
mixed and competitive, and regards the characteristics of the Chinese in-
dustries which promoted the country’s rapid economic growth as “active 
market penetration, dispersed market share and low price”. She also 
claims that the “public” corporations lack public character. 
Hiroyuki Kato of Kobe University, another leading scholar of this field 
in Japan, characterized Chinese “capitalism” as an “ambiguous institu-
tion” (neither public nor private) which contributed to China’s rapid eco-
nomic growth.  
(3) Limits of precedence research
Static
Even in Western countries, the relationship between the public and 
private sectors fluctuates in response to the short-term business cycle and 
the long-term transformation of the economy. Why is this not the case in 
China?
Lack of classification (other than Watanabe)
The conditions of competition are different from sector to sector and 
from industry to industry.
One-dimensional
Bremmer [2010] proposed a market spectrum with the utopia of com-
munism at one end and the utopia of libertarianism at the other, and state 
capitalism and free market capitalism situated in the middle. This is a 
very useful idea which avoids all-or-nothing selection. However, it is still a 
kind of zero sum game.
Source: Bremmer [2010]
Figure 4   Market Spectrum by Ian Bremmer
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(4) My approach to this theme
My viewpoints are as follows: A dynamic viewpoint which takes the 
fluctuating process of industrial development into account; a classified 
viewpoint in which the issues are classified according to the differences be-
tween industries; and a two-dimensional viewpoint in which the issues are 
analyzed from both the ownership axis and the market governance struc-
ture axis. This paper focuses on the last viewpoint.  
The telecommunications industry and the color television industry are 
analyzed from the above-mentioned dynamic, classified and two-dimen-
sional viewpoints.   
II.   ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF CHINESE TELECOM COMMON 
CARRIERS AND COLOR TELEVISION MANUFACTURERS
1. Telecommunications industry
(1) Development of telecommunications market in China
In the 21st century, the Chinese telecommunications market, especial-
ly the mobile phone market, has attained astonishing levels of develop-
ment. An important factor in this success is competition among telecom-
munications common carriers.    
Source: Original
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(2) Reorganization of telecom common carriers in China
Before 1993, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (MPT) mo-
nopolized the Chinese telecom market. In 1993, the Chinese government 
divided MPT and set up China Telecom as an operational department. At 
the same time, the government decided to open the telecom market to oth-
er domestic sectors. The Ministry of Electronics Industry and other bodies 
set up China Unicom in 1994 and the Ministry of Railways set up China 
Tietong in 2000. In 2000, China Telecom was divided into China Satcom, 
China Mobile and China Telecom, and in 2002, China Telecom was further 
divided into China Telecom and China Netcom. In spite of the increase in 
market actors, the competition was not effective other than in the mobile 
phone sector. In 2009, to promote effective competition among carriers, 
they were reorganized into three major carriers allowed to supply full-line 
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Figure 6 Mobile Phone Subscribers by Country (2000-2011㸧
Remarks: Lach of original data in 2009
Source:Made from ITU data,http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/
i     Mobile Phone S i    ( 000-201 )
Remarks: No original data availabe for 2009
Source:Made from ITU data,http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/
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telecommunication services and these three carriers were allowed to start 
third generation mobile telecommunications services. 
In spite of the frequent reorganization, by 2013 all of the telecom com-
mon carriers were SOEs governed by central government. (In December 
2013, the Chinese government issued MVNO licenses to 11 companies in-
cluding Alibaba, the biggest private e-commerce company. In the near fu-
ture, China will therefore have private-sector mobile phone common carri-
ers.)
(2) Control by public sector and competition
As all three carriers are SOEs managed by central government 
(SASAC), it is fair to say that the Chinese telecom market is completely 
controlled by SOEs, but that does not mean that there is no competition. 
Although the CCP and State Council control the appointment of the top 
management of the three carriers and services are regulated by the Minis-
try of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the carriers compete 
fiercely. In Nakagawa [2000] I name this the “State-State Competition 
System”.
  
Source: Original
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1. Color television manufacturing industry
(1) Black and white CRT televisions
In 1958, China succeeded in producing television broadcasting and re-
ceiver equipment and began  broadcasting. In the 1950s and 1960s, howev-
er, the buying power of Chinese consumers was limited and the govern-
ment gave priority to military utilization of electronics. The development 
of the television manufacturing industry was therefore limited.    
In the 1970s, electronics manufacturers, which had been dispersed as 
a result of war preparations, entered the television manufacturing market. 
Most of them were SOEs managed by local government.
In the 1980s, price control and production control by government were 
abolished and in 1991 control of the supply of CRTs was also abolished. 
(2) Color CRT televisions 
China succeeded in producing color television in 1971, but had fallen 
behind western countries in technology. The Chinese government decided 
to introduce color CRT technology from western countries, mainly Japan, 
and to try to control color television production through the supply of color 
CRTs.
The government set up Rainbow Electronics based on the technology 
of Japan’s Hitachi and Asahi Glass, and required three local SOEs (Bei-
jing-Matsushita, Shanghai Yongxin and Nanjinhuafei) to introduce color 
CRT production lines from Japanese companies. Other television set man-
ufacturers bought CRTs from these companies and assembled the televi-
sion sets.   
Marukawa of Tokyo University characterized this system as “vertical 
disintegration”. Contrary to its original intent, the government failed to 
concentrate the production of color television sets. At the time, color televi-
sion sets were a profitable product whose price was decided by central gov-
ernment. The above-mentioned CRT supply system lowered the entry bar-
rier, so that most local governments wanted to enter the color television 
industry and central government had to take their requests into account. 
Moreover, the increase in CRT production and import made government 
control of CRT supply ineffective. Local SOEs invested aggressively and 
color television production increased rapidly. In 1992, the price of color tel-
evision sets was deregulated  and in the following year government control 
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of CRT supply collapsed. 
Ironically, the concentration of production was realized not through 
government control but through market competition. The market share of 
the top ten manufacturers rose from 56.5% in 1993 to 80.5% in 1997 and 
80.6% in 2004.
(3) FDP (mainly LCD) televisions
Table 2   Share of chinese flat-screen television market by company(2008,2012 1st Q)
Brand 2008 2012　1stQ
Hisense 1 14.10% 1 17.90%
Skyworth 2 13.60% 3 14.10%
TCL 3 9.60% 2 17.00%
Konka 4 9.60% 5 10.30%
Changhong 5 9.50% 4 11.10%
Samsung 6 6.60% 8 4.00%
Sharp 7 6.00% 7 4.30%
Sony 8 5.50% 9 3.90%
Haier 9 4.60% 6 6.30%
others 20.90% 11.10%
Source: Display Search
Source: Marukawa [1999]
Figure 8   Television set production and trade in China
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Sales of FDP (plasma and LCD) television sets surpassed those of 
CRT televisions in urban areas in 2005 and in the whole Chinese market 
in 2009. The vertical disintegration system for CRT television sets has 
been extended to LCD television sets. The key components of LCD televi-
sion sets are LCDs and image-processing engines (image-processing LSI). 
Chinese LCD television manufacturers procure the two key components 
and assemble the television sets.
The LSD system differs in two points from the vertical disintegration 
system for CRT television sets.
The first is that in the case of CRT, Chinese set manufacturers pro-
cure CRTs from Chinese CRT manufacturers that have introduced produc-
tion lines from Japanese companies, whereas in the case of LCDs, Chinese 
set manufacturers import or procure mainly from subsidiaries of Korean 
companies in China. (Recently, however, Chinese LCD manufacturers are 
developing.) 
The second is that because the LCD market is now dominated by Ko-
rean and Taiwanese companies, some major Japanese set manufacturers 
which previously produced CRTs in-house (such as Toshiba and Sony) 
have also started to procure LCDs from other companies. These Japanese 
television set manufacturers have adopted the strategy of differentiating 
their products  by using image-processing engines produced in-house.   
In the early stages, Panasonic, Hitachi and Sharp led the FDP televi-
sion market in China. The Chinese companies Hisense and Prima entered 
at a relatively early date. Panasonic and Hitachi, which both invested 
mainly in plasma, suffered a decreased market share as the plasma mar-
ket grew sluggishly. Sony and Sharp offered a price reduction and recov-
ered market share in 2007 and 2008. After 2009, Taiwanese LCD makers 
offered LCDs to Chinese television set makers (LCDs account for about 
65% of the production costs of LCD television sets). Moreover, in 2007 
(-Jan. 2013) the Chinese government introduced a policy of “Electric Appli-
ances in Rural Areas” (家电下乡) which subsidized residents of rural dis-
tricts to buy electric appliances. As foreign companies do not have market-
ing channels in rural areas, this subsidy effectively promoted Chinese 
brands. In 2012, the government began to subsidize energy-saving electric 
appliances including LCD television sets with LED backlights. In reaction, 
the Korean manufacturers Samsung and LG changed from a market 
share-oriented to a profit-oriented strategy. In 2012, Chinese companies 
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achieved a market share of about 80%.     
Among the Chinese companies, TCL, Hisense, Skyworth, Konka, 
Changhong and Haier are the six major brands. Of these, the development 
of TCL since 2011 has been spectacular. According to Display Search, TCL 
ranked fifth in the world in the first quarter of 2012 with a 6.5% share of 
the world market and ranked third in the world in 2013. Other than the 
central government, the Shenzhen (深圳 ) city government also heavily 
supported TCL. To reduce production costs, TCL and Samsung set up a 
joint venture which produces LCDs in Shenzhen, but without the invest-
ment of the Shenzhen government, TCL could not have raised the re-
quired funds.
(3)  Ownership of six major television set manufacturers and 
their significance
Nominally, of the six major television set manufacturers, only Sky-
worth is a private company. Konka is a subsidiary of the central SOE Hua-
qiaocheng (华侨城), while TCL, Changhong and Hisense are SOEs man-
aged by the city governments of Huizhou, Mianyang and Qingdao, 
respectively. Haier is nominally collective.  
Judging from the nominal ownership of the six major companies, it is 
fair to say that the Chinese color television industry is almost completely 
dominated by the public sector. In effect, however, the five “public corpora-
tions” are near to being private. TCL started as a joint venture between 
Hong Kong (香港) and Huizhou (惠州) city, which subsequently fell under 
the effective control of  top management, including CEO Li Dongsheng (李
东生) under the contraction. Changhong (长虹) originally produced mili-
tary goods as a central SOE but moved on to producing goods for private 
use and became an SOE managed by the small city of Mianyang (绵䧈) in 
Sichuan Province (四川省).
Changhong was not appointed as a selected color television manufac-
turer by central government and therefore often ignored central govern-
ment policy. Changhong often leads low-priced competition in defiance of 
the price arrangements ordered by central government. Changhong also 
bought up CRTs to avoid control by central government. Konka also start-
ed as a joint venture between a Hong Kong company and a public firm in 
Guangdong Province and for long years was regarded as a foreign compa-
ny. As a result of the integration of the Chinese parent company as a  cen-
Rethinking of the “State Advance, Private-Sector Retreat” Phenomenon in China（NAKAGAWA）2015】 27
tral SOE and buy-back of the shares held by the Hong Kong company, 
Konka became a subsidiary of a central SOE. Haier was originally a small 
refrigerator manufacturer, developed under the leadership of Zhang Ruim-
ing (张瑞敏), China’s most famous entrepreneur .            
In the case of the telecommunications industry, all three major carri-
ers are central SOEs and were reorganized by government decision. In the 
color television industry, on the other hand, the major companies are not 
central SOEs and have grown and attained leading positions through com-
petition. Central government failed to concentrate the industry and at-
tempts at price regulation and production control through CRT supply col-
lapsed. At the same time, television manufacturers were supported by 
central government on the consumption side and by local government on 
the investment side. Conditions are thus different from those in other 
competitive industries such as the apparel industry.  
CONCLUSION
Judging from their nominal ownership, it is fair to say that the tele-
communications industry is completely, and the color television industry 
almost completely, dominated by SOEs. However, judgments of this kind 
are inappropriate when analyzing the effectiveness of the market and sug-
gesting useful policies. Sectors must rather be analyzed from the dynamic, 
Source: Original
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classified and two-dimensional viewpoints. The case studies of the tele-
communications and color television industries suggest that in spite of the 
domination by state-owned companies, a competitive market structure can 
develop and bring results.   
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